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NOT YOUR FATHER’S MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS: HATE
SPEECH AND THE FRAUDULENT MARKETPLACE OF
IDEAS CREATED BY SOCIAL MEDIA
“It’s all there specifically to kill people,” Devon Arthurs told police
after they found homemade bomb-making materials, two large boxes
of live ammunition, a shotgun, an AK-47 assault rifle, a framed
photograph of Oklahoma City Bomber Timothy McVeigh, a “trove of
neo-Nazi and white-supremacist propaganda,” and the bodies of
Arthurs’ two roommates.1

INTRODUCTION
The murder of Devon Arthurs’s roommates was the culmination of Arthurs
being radicalized into the world of white supremacist, neo-Nazis who dominated
alt-right social media forums and websites where Arthurs spent a considerable
amount of time.2 Right-wing violence, white supremacy, and racially-motivated
injustice hold a vital—but vile—place in the history of both the United States
and Germany. Hate speech and dissemination of information advocating dogmas
like white supremacy, however, are regulated differently in these two countries.
In recent years, racially-motivated, hate-based crimes have been on the rise,
both in the United States and abroad.3 From 2000 to 2016, white supremacists
were responsible for more homicides than any domestic extremist group in the
country.4 From 2008 to 2016, right-wing—including white supremacist—
attacks and violent events outnumbering such actions by Islamic extremists
almost two-to-one.5 The Global Terrorism Database operated by the University
of Maryland defines right-wing extremism as, “violence in support of the belief
that personal and/or national way of life is under attack” and is “[c]haracterized
1
Janet Reitman, All-American Nazis, ROLLING STONE (May 2, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/all-american-nazis-628023/ (explaining that Arthurs, 18, was a member of
Atomwaffen, an American neo-Nazi group and self-proclaimed “terrorist organization” aimed at “build[ing] a
Fourth Reich.” Arthurs was a frequent visitor to sites like the Daily Stormer where contributors speak of leading
“the youth in a rebellious cultural upheaval … [by] mold[ing] a social movement like the hippies did, that should
give us a huge source of radicalized and militant recruits to bolster our ranks in the next five years.”).
2
Id. (“Between 2012 and 2016 … there was a 600 percent increase in American white-nationalist movements on Twitter alone; white-nationalist groups now outperform ISIS in nearly every social metric.”).
3
See JOINT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, WHITE SUPREMACIST EXTREMISM POSES PERSISTENT THREAT OF
LETHAL VIOLENCE (2017); see Karsten Muller & Carlo Schwarz, Fanning the Flames of Hate: Social Media and
Hate Crime 16 (Univ. of Warwick Ctr. for Competitive Advantage in the Glob. Econ., Working Paper No. 373,
2018).
4
JOINT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, supra note 3 at 4.
5
David Neiwart et al., Homegrown Terror, REVEAL (June 22, 2017), https://apps.revealnews.org/homegrown-terror/.
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by … racial or ethnic supremacy or nationalism … and/or belief in conspiracy
theories that involve grave threat to national sovereignty and/or personal
liberty.”6 From 2008 to 2016, left-wing motivated violent events made up less
than ten percent of all domestic terror incidents.7 Though they occur more
frequently, violent incidents by right-wing and white supremacist groups were
thwarted less often than Islamic motivated attacks, indicating a misapplication
of resources.8 Many theories behind the disparity may be envisaged; the
pragmatic takeaway is that white supremacy poses a threat to the United States
that is not being adequately addressed and law enforcement is devoting less than
sufficient resources.9
Even before taking office, the Trump Administration began working on
plans to “redirect national-security resources away from white supremacists to
focus solely on Islamic terrorism.”10 In 2016, the Office of Community
Partnerships, which houses the Countering Violent Extremism Task Force,
created by President Barack Obama, had a 16 person staff, with 25 additional
contractors, and a $21 million budget tasked with preemptively stopping acts of
violent extremism.11 By 2018, the office was reduced to eight employees
working with less than $3 million meaning that “[e]ffectively, it no longer
exists” according to a former Department of Homeland Security official.12 Such
a claw-back of resources is wholly inappropriate given the dangers of the digital
world in which speech takes place today.
The “marketplace of ideas” envisioned by Justice Oliver Wendall Holmes in
Abrams v. United States, in which the “test of truth is the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market,” is no longer limited to
6
Global Terrorism Database, Ideological Motivations of Terrorism in the United States, 1970–2016,
NATIONAL CONSORTIUM FOR STUDY OF TERRORISM & RESPONSES TO TERRORISM (Nov. 2017),
https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_IdeologicalMotivationsOfTerrorismInUS_Nov2017.pdf. (Based on
this definition, this paper will use the terms “white supremacy,” “right-wing extremism,” and any iteration interchangeably.)
7
See Neiwart et al., supra note 5.
8
Id.
9
Among other organizations aimed at researching and combatting right-wing terrorism, the State Department under the Trump Administration, in the summer of 2018, discontinued funding for the University of
Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database after a researcher used the data provided to draw attention to the rise and
disproportionate incidents of right-wing terrorism relative to other forms. Emily Atkin, A Database Showed FarRight Terrorism on the Rise. Then Trump Defunded it., THE NEW REPUBLIC, (Jan. 3, 2019), https://newrepublic.com/article/152675/database-showed-far-right-terror-rise-trump-defunded-it.
10
Abigail Tracy, “We Are at a Turning Point”: Counterterrorism Experts Say Trump Is Inspiring a Terrifying New Era of Right-Wing Violence, VANITY FAIR (Nov. 2, 2018, 8:38 AM), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018/11/trump-administration-tree-of-life-shooting-domestic-terrorism.
11
Id.
12
Id.
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newspapers, radio and television broadcasts, and in-person word-of-mouth.13
The internet and social media can connect and foster interactions and
communications with people and points of view in previously unimaginable
ways. The ability to connect with others around the world, however, is not
without drawbacks. For all of the good that can come from the diversity of
thought and exposure to different ideals, the Internet also includes “the
depraved.”14 The Internet is seemingly anonymous by default and thus has
become a “valuable means of communication for those of ill will.”15 According
to George Selim, the former head of the Countering Violent Extremism Task
Force, the “technical capability” and “social media savvy” have coincided with
an increase in extremism, and “the mainstreaming of hate and extremism as part
of our political discourse … allows for … bigots to better connect and organize
online.”16
This is not your father’s marketplace of ideas.17
In Germany, Holocaust denial and similar hate speech are not protected
under the German Constitution.18 This Comment will address whether similar
white supremacist and Nazi hate speech, when spread through social media
companies like Facebook, are an unprotected form of speech subject to contentneutral time, place, and manner regulation by Congress.19 This Comment will
then address how white supremacist hate speech, distributed and circulated
through social media platforms, can be regulated under the Commerce Clause if
their information distribution mechanism, like the “newsfeed” on Facebook,
algorithmically displays content based on user engagement instead of, for
example, the time at which a post was published.
Part I details the background and history of hate speech in the United States
and Germany, the rising importance of the internet, and in particular social
media, compared with the information dissemination methods and capabilities
of the past, the theory and function behind user-generated algorithms in social
13

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Homes, J. dissenting).
Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Extremist Speech and the Internet: The Continuing Importance of Brandenburg, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 361, 362 (2010).
15
Id.
16
Tracy, supra note 10.
17
See Oldsmobile: Victim of Its Own Brand, SLATE (Dec. 13, 2000, 2:31 PM), https://slate.com/business/2000/12/oldsmobile-victim-of-its-own-brand.html.
18
See Robert Kahn, Cross-Burning, Holocaust Denial, and the Development of Hate Speech Law in the
United States and Germany, 83 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 163, 188–93 (2006).
19
See generally Yulia Timofeeva, Hate Speech Online: Restricted or Protected–Comparison of Regulations in the United States and Germany, 12 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 253 (2003) (comparing hate speech
regulations in the United States and Germany).
14
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media, and the Commerce Clause as it relates to the transmission of data. Part
III will discuss the rise of an insular right-wing media ecosystem that has come
about in recent decades. Part IV details a November 2018 district court opinion
addressing the use of social media by white supremacists.
Part IV will address the similarities between American and German
jurisprudence regarding hate speech, and how American jurisprudence is primed
to adopt a view similar to that of Germany. This section will show that white
supremacist and Nazi hate speech is not a protected class of speech in the United
States and is subject to content neutral time, place, and manner regulation. Part
V will then discuss how white supremacist and Nazi hate speech on social media
platforms could be regulated under the Commerce Clause.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. The History of Hate Speech Regulation in the United States and Germany
Regulation of hate speech in both the United States and Germany grew out
of the worldwide geopolitical shift after World War II. However, forms and
categories of hate speech as well as the reasons and bases upon which hate
speech can be regulated in each country differ. Despite this divergent evolution,
both the American and German philosophies regarding freedom of speech grow
partly out of each countries’ history and relationship with oppressive
governmental regimes. This reliance on history has led to similar thinking and
reasoning that has ultimately been interpreted differently by each countries’
courts.
This Section will detail the evolution of hate speech regulation in the United
States with particular emphasis on the doctrines of imminent lawless action,
fighting words, content neutrality, and true threats. This section will then address
the development of hate speech regulation in Germany with emphasis on the
outlawing of Holocaust denial and other Nazi-related speech.
1. Hate Speech in America
The modern era of hate speech regulation arose in the midst of the Vietnam
War. In 1969, the Supreme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio held that an Ohio law
criminalizing the advocacy of violence for political purposes violated the First
Amendment.20 In Brandenburg, the Court overturned the conviction of a Ku

20

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969).
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Klux Klan leader who was filmed using racist and anti-Semitic speech in the
presence of firearms.21 In a per curium opinion, the Court created the imminent
lawless action test under which the First Amendment generally does not allow a
State to ban or prohibit one from advocating for the “use of force or law
violation.”22 However, the Court carved out an exception for when “such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action.”23
Prior to Brandenburg, in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Court indicated
that there is no absolute right to freedom of speech.24 The Court asserted that
“the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’
words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace” are not protected classes of speech because they
are not an “essential part of any exposition of ideas.”25 The Court considered
those classes of speech to be “of such slight social value as a step to truth that
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality.”26
The next significant development in hate speech-related First Amendment
jurisprudence came in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul—the test of content-neutrality.27
The Court declared unconstitutional a Minnesota statute that banned acts of
cross-burning because the Government cannot arbitrarily draw content-based
distinctions in its regulation of speech.28 The majority created the “content
neutrality” doctrine which stand for “the idea that the government has no right
to discriminate against speech on the basis of its content.”29 According to content
neutrality, there is a presumption against content-based regulations, though,
exceptions do exist.30 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, detailed two
instances in which content-based distinctions are permissible.31 One, “when the
basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire
class of speech at issue is proscribable” there is “no significant danger of idea or

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Id. at 444–45.
Id. at 447.
Id.
Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire 62 S. Ct. 766, 769 (1942).
Id.
Id.
R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
Id. at 377.
Kahn, supra note 18 at 172.
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382.
Id. at 388–89.
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view-point [sic] discrimination.”32 Two, if the purpose of the regulation was to
limit the “secondary effects” of the speech.33 The Court stated content-based
regulations of “a proscribable class of speech can be swept up incidentally within
the reach of a statute directed at conduct rather than speech.”34
In Renton v. Playtime Theatres, a city ordinance prohibiting “any ‘adult
motion picture theater’ from locating within 1,000 feet of any residential zone,
single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, or park, and within one mile of any
school” was found to not violate the First Amendment because the ordinance did
not “ban adult theaters altogether,” but merely circumscribes where in the town
they may be located and was thus aimed secondary effects of the film “on the
surrounding community” rather than the content.35 As such, the ordinance was
content-neutral because it was “justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech,” and thus was a “time, place, and manner regulation” rather
than a content-based regulation aimed at suppressing the content displayed by
adult movie theaters.36 Additionally, regulatory response can address different
kinds of speech based upon differing degrees of “special and overriding
interest.”37
Content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations are constitutional if
“they are designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and do not
unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication.”38 The Court found
that the ordinance was narrowly tailored despite it ostensibly targeting adult
theaters because it potentially would regulate “other kinds of adult businesses”
that may be prone to producing similar secondary effects despite it not doing so
at the time.39 The Court also found that alternative avenues of communication
were left open because not only was there plenty of acreage and retail space
available in parts of the city where the theaters could be located, but respondents
were required to “fend for themselves … on an equal footing with”
competitors.40
32

Id. at 388.
Id. at 389 (citing Renton v. Playtime Theaters, 106 S.Ct. 925, 929 (1986) et. al).
34
Id.
35
Renton, 106 S.Ct. at 929.
36
Id. at 929 (citing Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 771 (1976)).
37
Id. at 930 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509–11 (1969)).
38
Id. at 928.
39
Id. at 931 (“That Renton chose first to address the potential problems created by one particular kind of
adult business in no way suggest that the city has ‘singled out’ adult theaters for discriminatory treatment.”).
40
Id. at 932 (“[the ordinance] sought to make some areas available for adult theaters and their patrons,
while at the same time preserving the quality of life in the community at large by preventing those theaters from
locating in other areas.”).
33
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R.A.V. has been criticized as applying the content neutrality doctrine “too
rigidly.”41 In his concurring opinion, Justice White accuses the Court of ignoring
precedent in this area of the law and chastises the majority saying contextual
interpretation is paramount.42 In Justice White’s view, the categorical approach
is “firmly entrenched” in the First Amendment.43 Critics argue that by failing to
address the historical context in which cross-burning and the Klan occurred in
America, “Scalia failed to distinguish himself, and by extension all American
citizens, from the taint of racism.”44
A little over a decade later in Virginia v. Black, the court was again
confronted with a statute prohibiting cross-burning.45 A Virginia law that made
it “unlawful for any person, … with intent of intimidating any person or group
of persons, to burn, or cause to be burned, a cross on the property of another, a
highway, or other public place” was the basis for the conviction of Ku Klux Klan
members who had burned a cross on a farm and two men who had burned a cross
on the lawn of an African-American family.46 Holding that a cross burning
conducted with the intent to intimidate is not a protected class of speech under
the First Amendment, the Court created the true threats doctrine whereby
“‘[t]rue threats’ encompass those statements where the speaker means to
communicate a serious [expression of an] intent to commit an act of unlawful
violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”47 The Ku Klux Klan
members who had burned the cross on the farm were not punished because, due
to the lack of spectators, their actions fell short of the statute’s reach.48 The Court
did, however, view the burning of the cross in the front yard of the AfricanAmerican family as a true threat due to the presence of spectators and the clear
political symbolism that is present when a cross is burned in the front yard of an
African-American family, unlike a Ku Klux Klan rally where like-minded
members of a group are gathered.49

41

Kahn, supra note 18, at 173.
R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 400 (1992) (White, J., Concurring) (internal citations omitted) (“such
clear statements ‘must be taken in context’ and are not ‘literally true.’”)
43
Id.
44
Kahn, supra note 18, at 173, n. 56.
45
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 347 (2003).
46
Id. at 348.
47
Id. at 359.
48
Id. at 366.
49
See id. at 365. “Virginia’s statute does not run afoul of the First Amendment insofar as it bans cross
burning with intent to intimidate…. Indeed, in the case of Elliott and O’Mara, it is at least unclear whether the
respondents burned a cross due to racial animus.” Id. at 362.
42
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Under the true threats doctrine, the perpetrator or speaker does not have to
actually intend for their speech to go unprotected by the First Amendment.50 The
prohibition protects against: (1) the “possibility that the threatened violence will
occur,” (2) “from the fear of violence,” and (3) “from the disruption that fear
engenders.”51
In Boos v. Barry, the Court refined Renton by clarifying that the “secondary
effects” that were the object of the ordinance were those “almost unique to
theaters featuring sexually explicit films, i.e., prevention of crime … and
protection of residential neighborhoods” and that the regulations “appl[ied] to a
particular category of speech because the regulatory targets happen to be
associated with that type of speech.”52 The portion of a District of Columbia
statute prohibiting the “display of any sign within 500 feet of a foreign embassy”
if the sign is protesting the policies that embassy’s government was found to
violate the First Amendment.53 The statute was not justified by a compelling
government interest and was inherently content-based because whether the sign
was banned depended entirely upon what it said.54 The Court was careful to
clarify, however, that listener reaction was not the “secondary effect” referred
to in Renton.55
The second part of the statute prohibiting “any congregation of three or more
persons within 500 feet of a foreign embassy” was found constitutional if
interpreted according to the limitations imposed by the Court of Appeals.56 The
Court of Appeals limited the statute to permit “the dispersal only of
congregations that are directed at the embassy” and “only when the police
reasonably believe that a threat to the security or peace of the embassy is
present.”57 Narrowed in this manner, the statute withstood overbreadth concerns
50

Id. at 360.
Id. (emphasis added).
52
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320 (1988) (“So long as the justifications for regulation have nothing to
do with content, i.e., the desire to suppress crime has nothing to do with the actual films being shown inside
adult movie theaters, we concluded that the regulation was properly analyzed as content neutral.”).
53
Id. at 315, 332–33.
54
Compare id. at 330–31 (where the congregation clause “merely regulate[d] the place and manner of
certain restrictions”), with R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 393 (where the regulation can be justified if “based on the very
reasons why the particular class of speech at issue … is proscribable”). This would be the case if the
statute banned all display signs in front of foreign embassies. Boos, 485 U.S. at 330–31.
55
Boos, 485 U.S. at 319–21. See also id. at 321–23 (citing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S.
46, 56 (1988)) (“As a general matter, we have indicated that in public debate our own citizens must tolerate
insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide “adequate ‘breathing space’ to the freedoms protected
by the First Amendment.”). This language is very similar to the freedom to form and hold opinions in Germany.
Compare id. with supra II.A.2.
56
Id. at 315–16, 332–33.
57
Id. at 329–31. Finzer v. Barry, 255 U. S. App. D. C., at 40, 798 F. 2d, at 1471.
51
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because it is only a place and manner regulation; constitutionally protected
conduct was not implicated.58
At issue in Hill v. Colorado was a state statute making it unlawful within
“100 feet of the entrance to any healthcare facility … to ‘knowingly approach’
within eight feet of another person, without that person’s consent, ‘for the
purpose of a passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in
oral protest, education, or counseling with such other person.… ”59 Petitioners
in the case claimed that the statute abridged their ability to approach persons
walking towards or entering establishments performing abortions.60 The Court
stated that the statute in question concerns only regulations that “protect listeners
from unwanted communication[,]” not speech aimed at those who are willing,
and that even though freedom of speech “includes the right to attempt to
persuade others to change their views” the “protection afforded to offensive
messages does not always embrace offensive speech that is so intrusive that the
unwilling audience cannot avoid it.”61 The Court emphasizes that an unwilling
listener has an interest in “avoiding unwanted communication” which is a part
of “the broader ‘right to be let alone’”62 This right to be let alone is weighed
against the right to communicate and is of particular weight when “the degree of
captivity makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid
exposure.”63 According to the Court, the first assessment in an analysis of
content neutrality and time, place, and manner regulations is determining
whether disagreement with the speech’s message is the reason for adoption.64

58
Id. at 1169 (“The congregation clause does not prohibit peaceful congregations; its reach is limited to
groups posing a security threat. As we have noted, ‘where demonstrations turn violent, they lose their protected
quality as expression under the First Amendment.’”) (internal citation omitted).
59
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 707 (2000).
60
Id. at 708 (The court referred to the practice as “sidewalk counseling.” “‘Sidewalk counseling’ consists
of efforts ‘to educate, counsel, persuade, or inform passersby about abortion and abortion alternatives by means
of verbal or written speech, including conversation and/or display of signs and/or distribution of literature.’”).
61
Id. at 716 (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988)); see also Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422
U.S. 205, 210–11, n.6 (1975) (citation and brackets omitted) (“Indeed ‘it may not be the content of the speech,
as much as the deliberate “verbal or visual assault,” that justifies proscription.”).
62
Id. at 716 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting));
Madsen v. Womens Health Center, Inc., 114 S.Ct 2516, 2528 (1994)) (The “First Amendment does not
demand that patients at a medical facility undertake Herculean efforts to escape the cacophony of political
protests.”).
63
Hill, 503 U.S. at 718 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
64
Id. at 719 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)) (“The statute applies
to all persons who ‘knowingly approach’ within eight feet of another person for the purpose of leafletting or
displaying signs; for such persons, the content of their oral statements is irrelevant. With respect to persons who
are neither leafletters nor sign carriers, however, the statute does not apply unless their approach is ‘for the
purpose of … engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling.’”).
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The statute only minorly restricted an “extremely broad category of speech”
related to unwilling listeners, not an absolute ban on speech.65
In the United States, the content of the speech in question is of paramount
importance when questions of restriction and regulation of speech are presented,
even if the speech has the potential, or in fact does, offend, intimidate, threaten,
or harm others. In Germany, however, more emphasis and consideration are put
on the effects of one’s speech and the actual or potential offense, intimidation,
or harm that occurs as a result.

2. Hate Speech in Germany
The philosophy of German courts regarding the freedom of speech, and hate
speech, in particular, is partly a function of Germany’s role in World War II and
the Nazi regime. The German Constitution grants all persons the right to freely
“express and disseminate his opinions in speech, writing, and pictures and freely
to inform himself without hindrance from generally accessible sources.”66 Like
the United States, this right is not unlimited. The exercise of one’s freedom of
speech is “limited in the provisions of the general laws … and in the right to
inviolability of personal honor.”67 Each person has the right to the “free
development of [their] personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of
others or offend against the constitutional order[.]”68
The concept of human dignity is the benchmark against which all rights are
measured.69 Germany views “dignity and equality” as deserving a “higher
degree of protection” than the “verbally aggressive speech” used to attack those
qualities in others.70 Section 130 of the German Criminal Code emphasizes the
hierarchy of values by making illegal acts which “assault[ ] the human dignity
of” or “incite[ ] hatred against a national, racial, religious group or a group
defined by their ethnic origins” or “segments of the population … because of
their belonging to one of these aforementioned groups” which are undertaken in
“a manner capable of disturbing the public peace.”71 This prohibition extends to

65
Id. at 723 (“Each can attempt to educate unwilling listeners on any subject, but without consent may
not approach within eight feet to do so.”).
66
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], Art. 5(1), translation https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/
80201000.pdf.
67
Id. art. 5(2).
68
Id. art. 2(1).
69
Winfried Brugger, The Treatment of Hate Speech in German Constitutional Law (Part I), 4 GERMAN
L. J. 1 (2003).
70
Id.
71
STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], § 130.
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acts that lead to: “(1) incitement of hatred; (2) provocation of violence or
lawlessness against personal freedom; and (3) insult, ridicule, and defame (not
including mere expression of disrespect or disparaging assertions whose truth or
untruth cannot be proven).”72
German courts, similar to American courts, classify protected classes based
on whether a distinct group is or was at a time marginalized, victimized, or
persecuted, such as those of the Jewish religion under the Nazi regime.73 Hate
speech directed at a group with “clearly defined characteristics that distinguish
it from the rest of the population” is not presumptively protected.74 The German
Constitutional Court, in Lüth, limited the distribution of films made by a popular
World War II era filmmaker because it would mean “nothing had changed in
German cultural life since the National Socialist period …” if such films could
still be freely disseminated.75 The Court balanced economic and freedom of
speech interests stating, “where the formation of public opinion on a matter
important to the general welfare is concerned, private and especially individual
economic interests must, in principle, yield.”76
In 1959, after a distributor of anti-Semitic pamphlets was found not to have
targeted all Jews but “International Jewry” by a judge who, it was later
discovered, had authored an anti-Semitic law journal article during the Nazi
period, the state brought a case against the pamphlet which was found to have
endangered the state due to its “racial hatred” and its threatening nature to
“regular constitutional order.”77
Holocaust denial is not afforded protection in Germany.78 In the Zionist
Swindle case, the Federal Supreme Court ruled that Holocaust denial is not
protected by one’s right to freedom of speech because the “spreading of untrue
statements” is not a protected interest.79 The perpetrator of the denial, “[b]y

72
Chris Henry, Wider Vision: Hate Speech Law, Public Opinion and Homosexual Rights in Germany
and the United States, 30 CONN. J. INT’L. L. 123, 184 (2015) (citing Bradley A. Appleman, Hate Speech: A
Comparison of the Approaches Taken by the United States and Germany, 14 WIS. INT’L J. 422, 432 (1996)).
73
Kahn, supra note 18, at 185 (“When someone today speaks disparagingly about ‘the Jews,’ then it is
generally to be accepted that he intends that group of persons against when the National Socialist persecution of
Jews was directed.”).
74
Id.
75
Henry, supra note 72, at 132 (citing Michel Rosenfeld, Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence:
A Comparative Analysis, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523 (2003)).
76
Id.
77
Kahn, supra note 18, at 186 (quoting BGHSt, 13, 32 (Ger.) (1959)).
78
BVerfG, 1BvR23/94, Apr. 13, 1994, https://law.utexas.edu/transnational/foreign-law-translations/german/case.php?id=621.
79
Kahn, supra note 18, at 187.
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characterizing the Holocaust as a Zionist swindle,” had directly attacked the
“self-conception of those singled out for persecution as Jews” and thus his
speech impacted all Jewish people, not just Holocaust survivors.80 As such, all
Germans have a duty to do whatever is required to avoid falling back into the
cultural conditions that allowed the Nazi regime to sprout up and flourish.81
In 1994, the German Constitutional Court again addressed the issue of
Holocaust denial when a British Holocaust denier David Irving, a “revisionist of
the extreme right wing,” was prevented from giving a lecture in Munich.82 The
Court found that the denial of the Holocaust is not protected because, like in
Zionist Swindle, denial is an untrue fact and thus unprotected by the freedom of
opinion.83 The Constitutional Court acknowledged that while speech is
presumptively free, protection and this presumption end where “[the statements]
cease to contribute anything to the formation of opinion that is presupposed in
constitutional law.”84 The Constitutional Court specified that Holocaust denial
was an opinion, and not a fact, because the “persecution of Jews in the Third
Reich is an assertion of fact” that is proved to be true “according to innumerable
eye witness [sic] reports and documents, the verdicts of courts in numerous
criminal proceedings, and the findings of history.”85 The word “opinion,” in this
context, can be equated with freedom of expression and freedom of thought in
American legal culture because it includes both “the formation of opinion and
artistic or scholarly ideas” and the “expression of opinion and creation of works
of art or science.”86 Additionally, “opinion” includes consideration of the “effect
of opinion, art, or science on the addressee or audience;” a consideration that
has, at times, been of less concern to American courts.87
The Constitutional Court emphasized that speech asserted to be fact is open
to evaluation and criticism based on its truth because “the objective relationship
between the statement and reality predominates”88 This objectivity means that
factually incorrect information “is not an interest worthy of protection” and thus
a factual assertion “known or prove[n] to be untrue” is not covered by the

80

Kahn, supra note 18, at 187.
Id. at 188.
82
BVerfG, 1BvR23/94, Apr. 13, 1994, https://law.utexas.edu/transnational/foreign-law-translations/german/case.php?id=621.
83
Id.
84
Id. (internal citation omitted).
85
Id.
86
Brugger, supra note 69, at 4.
87
Id. See generally R.A.V., 505 U.S. 377.
88
BVerfG, 1BvR23/94, Apr. 13, 1994, https://law.utexas.edu/transnational/foreign-law-translations/german/case.php?id=621.
81
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freedom of opinion protection.89 The Constitutional Court was careful to clarify
that the “duty to be truthful” must not chill the freedom of opinion out of fear of
punishment.90
B. The History of the Commerce Clause as It Pertains to Aggregate Economic
Impact
Article I, § 8 of the United States Constitution authorizing Congress “[t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,” has a
turbulent history.91 Beginning just before the start of the New Deal and the end
of World War II, the Supreme Court began to usher in a new era of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence that it only recently began limiting. In Wickard v. Filburn,
the Court upheld application of the Agricultural Adjustment Act to a farmer who
had grown more than his allotted amount of wheat.92 The Court found that by
growing wheat for personal use, the farmer was affecting the national market for
wheat which in the aggregate, had a substantial effect on interstate commerce
even though individually, a single farmer’s personal wheat was ostensibly
negligible.93
Like many other areas of the American jurisprudence, the Commerce Clause
is inherently tied to racial animus and the oppression of people of color which
pervades U.S. history. Relying on Wickard, the Court, in Heart of Atlanta, Inc.
v. U.S., found that the Civil Rights Act of 1964’s prohibition of refusal of service
to customers on the basis of race was justified under the Commerce Clause
because discrimination by hotels has a detrimental effect on interstate
commerce.94 During this period, African-Americans published books and
pamphlets informing minority families of towns and hotels where it was safe to
stop while traveling in addition to hotels and restaurants that would serve them.95
The Court in Heart of Atlanta, Inc. v. U.S., held that the threat of being unsafe
or unable to stop at certain hotels and motels in certain parts of the country
significantly deterred interstate commerce as whole groups of people were
disincentivized from traveling across state lines.96 The Court specified that the
89

Id.
Id.
91
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
92
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 133 (1942).
93
Id. at 127–28.
94
Heart of Atlanta, Inc. v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241, 253 (1964).
95
Jacinda Townsend, How the Greenbook Helped African-American Tourists Navigate a Segregated
South, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Apr. 2016), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/historygreen-book-african-american-travelers-180958506/.
96
See generally Heart of Atlanta, Inc, 379 U.S. at 252–53.
90
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fact that though “Congress was legislating against moral wrongs … rendered its
enactments no less valid.”97 In the Court’s view, it was irrelevant that the
obstruction of interstate commerce encompassed a “moral and social wrong.98
The Court began limiting the scope of the Commerce Clause in 1995 in
United States v. Lopez.99 The Court found that the Gun-Free School Zones Act
of 1990 was unconstitutional because a student bringing a loaded .38-caliber
handgun to school did not fall under Congress’s ability to regulate those
activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.100 The Court
reached this conclusion because, inter alia, the statute’s application was not
restricted to cases where the gun had been in interstate commerce.101
The substantial effects test elucidated in Lopez was further limited in United
States v. Morrison where the civil damages provision of the Violence Against
Women Act was found unconstitutional despite evidence that domestic violence
and violence against women have a substantial effect on the economy.102 Chief
Justice Rehnquist claimed that the Court did not need to “adopt a categorical
rule against aggregating the effects of noneconomic activity.”103
C. Social Media and the Proliferation of User-Generated Algorithms
Facebook had 214 million users in the United States and over 2.23 billion
active users as of the second quarter of 2018.104 This is larger than the population
of China which stands at 1.427 billion for 2018.105 For much of Facebook, and
other social media companies’ histories, the focus has been on growth.106 “Daily
Active Users” is the metric which social media companies live and die by.107

97

Id. at 257.
Id.
99
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).
100
Id. at 567–68.
101
Id.
102
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619 (2000).
103
Id. at 613.
104
Number of Facebook users in the United States as of January 2018, by age group (in millions),
STATISTA https://www.statista.com/statistics/398136/us-facebook-user-age-groups/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2018);
Number of monthly active Facebook users worldwide as of 2nd quarter 2019 (in millions) STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-users-worldwide/ (last visited
Sept. 21, 2018).
105
China Population, WORLDOMETERS, https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/china-population/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2019).
106
Evan Osnos, Can Mark Zuckerberg Fix Facebook Before It Breaks Democracy, NEW YORKER (Sept.
10, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/09/17/can-mark-zuckerberg-fix-facebook-before-itbreaks-democracy.
107
Id.
98
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Since most social media companies depend on outside investment—which
typically depends on Daily Active User rates—the success or failure of a social
media company, particularly in the early stages of life, depends on constant
growth of active users.108 As a result, much of Facebook’s corporate strategy has
been aimed at growth without as much focus on the content of what is being
published on the website.109
In January of 2018, Facebook announced that it would be altering the way
information is organized and displayed to the user.110 The order in which posts
and published material will be displayed will depend both upon the amount of
“likes, comments, and shares” a post gets and whether it is posted or published
by a friend or a business.111 The “Newsfeed” is the information display
mechanism on the Facebook homepage where one’s Facebook friend’s posts and
advertisements are displayed as semi-identical looking posts.112 The more likes,
comments, and shares a post gets, the further to the top of the Newsfeed it gets
pushed, especially if posted or published by a person in a person’s friends list.113
The problem with this model of information distribution is that “[p]osts that
tap into negative, primal emotions like anger or fear . . perform best and so
proliferate.”114 Additionally, social media sites, many of which are free and
require no identity verification, present no barrier to entry.115 One only needs an
internet connection to log into begin posting in these communities.116
According to Princeton University social psychologist Betsy Paluck,
people’s behavior adapts instinctively to social norms which can stop someone
from engaging in behavior that violates those norms.117 This process is
interrupted by Facebook because it “siphons us into like-minded groups and,
108

Id.
Id.
110
Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK, (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/101044130
15393571 (last visited Sept. 21, 2019).
111
Jose Angelo Gallegos, Why Facebook’s New Algorithm Means You Need to Invest in UGC Right Now,
TINUP (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.tintup.com/blog/facebooks-new-algorithm-means-need-invest-ugc-rightnow/.
112
Vangie Beal, Facebook News Feed, Webopedia (2019) https://www.webopedia.com/TERM/F/
Facebook_News_Feed.html.
113
Gallegos, supra note 111.
114
Amanda Taub & Max Fischer, Facebook Fueled Anti-Refugee Attacks in Germany, New Research
Suggests, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/21/world/europe/facebook-refugeeattacks-germany.html.
115
Id.
116
Kitsuron Sangsuvan, Balancing Freedom of Speech on the Internet Under International Law, 39 N.C.J.
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 701, 722–23 (2014).
117
Taub & Fischer, supra note 114.
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through its algorithm, promotes content that engages our base emotions” by
positioning content which has received the most “likes” at the top.118 This can
give the “impression that there is widespread community support for violence”
which may change an individual’s belief that if they acted, they “wouldn’t be
acting alone.”119 Heavy social media users may begin equating insincere
“trolling” and “sincere hate” meaning “Facebook can provide a closed
environment with its own moral rules.”120
The more often someone posts on Facebook, the more likely they are to be
“more extreme,” according to Princeton University social scientist Andrew
Guess, which can lead casual users to see a “world shaped by superposters.”121
The world which Facebook users see appears to be more extreme and dangerous
because the traditional practice of “professional gatekeepers such as editors”
deciding what gets published gets overridden by user-generated content.122
There is no editorial process whereby false or extreme ideas get filtered out.123
Such superposters and their distorted casual user’s worldview into reevaluating
hostility towards refugees and distrust of authority as new social norms despite
no widespread support for these positions .124
According to a study conducted by the University of Warwick, social media
is not only “fertile soil for the spread of hateful ideas,” but it “motivates real-life
action.”125 Analyzing “detailed local data on Facebook usage with usergenerated content,” the study found that the connection between “users’ internet
or Facebook access” and anti-refugee violence “reflects a causal effect”
indicating that far-right and white supremacist content, when grouped with usergenerated algorithms, causes violence to rise in the real world.126 Indeed, an
increase of one standard deviation of Facebook use coincided with a fifty percent
increase in attacks on refugees.127 The research estimates with a high degree of
certainty that in the absence of anti-refugee Facebook posts on a single far-right
German Facebook page, thirteen percent fewer anti-refugee incidents would
have taken place in Germany.128 Additionally, the study found that “Facebook

118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Müller & Schwarz, supra note 3, at 42.
Id. at 4, 42.
Taub & Fischer, supra note 114.
Müller & Schwarz, supra note 3, at 41.
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disruptions” caused by internet outages in a municipality “fully undo the effect
of social media propagation[;]” such disruptions in areas with high Facebook
usage were accompanied by a drop in attacks on refugees equal to the rate at
which heavy use is predicted to increase attacks.129
II. THE RIGHT-WING MEDIA ECOSYSTEM AND THE INCREASED
PREDISPOSITION OF OLDER AND CONSERVATIVE AMERICANS TO SHARE
FAKE NEWS
In a separate study, Guess and his colleagues found that Republicans were
more likely than Democrats to share fake news stories with their friends on
Facebook; those who identified as “very conservative” shared the most fake
news articles.130 Additionally, the study found that Facebook users over the age
of sixty-five shared almost seven times as many fake articles as the youngest
group in the study.131 The study also found that “more fake news stories …
offered pro-Trump or anti-Clinton content, aimed specifically at Republicans
and conservatives.”132 This suggests that more false or misleading information
exists in the right-wing than in the left-wing media ecosystem.
The online right-wing media ecosystem, grounded in websites like
Breitbart.com, has used social media to create a “distinct, [] insulated … [and]
hyper-partisan perspective to the world.”133 A study by the Columbia Journalism
Review found “asymmetric” polarization between the conservative and liberal
media worlds, thereby giving the “conservative media sphere” the ability to great
affect the entire media world.134 The study found that “many of the most-shared
stories” can be described as “disinformation: the purposeful construction of true
or partly true bits of information into a message that is, at its core, misleading”
which turns the “right-wing media system into an internally coherent, relatively
insulated knowledge community, reinforcing the shared worldview of

129

Id. at 29; see Taub & Fischer, supra note 114.
Andrew Guess et al., Less Than You Think: Prevalence and Predictors of Fake News Dissemination
on Facebook, 5 SCI. ADVANCES MAG. 1, 5 (Jan. 9, 2019), available at http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/5/1/eaau4586/tab-pdf.
131
Id. at 2.
132
Andy Guess et al., Who Was More Likely to Share Fake News in 2016? Seniors., WASH. POST (Jan. 9,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2019/01/09/who-shared-fake-news-duringthe-2016-election-campaign-youll-be-surprised/?utm_term=.6b2f9e8c40f0; see Andrew Guess et al. supra note
130.
133
Yochai Benkler et al., Study: Breitbart-Led Right-Wing Media Ecosystem Altered Broader Media
Agenda, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.cjr.org/analysis/breitbart-media-trump-harvard-study.php.
134
Id.
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readers[.]”135
When compared with more traditional media, the most notable aspects of the
right-wing media ecosystem are: (1) the lack of “center-right sites” that tend to
draw mostly conservatives and a substantial number of liberals; and (2) that
right-wing media, in its current iteration, is still in its infancy.136 For example,
only “the New York Post existed when Ronald Reagan was elected” in 1980 and
only the Washington Times had been created by the 1992 election of Bill
Clinton.137 The substantial increase in right-wing partisan websites which
“exceeds the number of sites in the clearly partisan left” exemplifies the lack of
center-right sites such as the Wall Street Journal.138 Additionally, there was a
“dramatic increase” in the “levels of attention” that clearly partisan right-wing
websites receive that does not exist on the left.139
During the 2016 election, these hyper-partisan websites were adjusting the
broader media conversation to conservative points, causing mainstream media
coverage to capitulate and discuss predominately what the right-wing media
wanted.140 These points of interest were then framed “in terms of terror [and]
crime” by the right-wing media.141
The Columbia Journalism Review study found a “network of mutuallyreinforcing hyper-partisan sites that revive what Richard Hofstadter called ‘the
paranoid style in American politics,’ combining decontextualized truths,
repeated falsehoods, and leaps of logic to create a fundamentally misleading
view of the world.”142 This right-wing insulation is created and reinforced
through a “potent mix of verifiable facts … familiar repeated falsehoods,
paranoid logic, and consistent political orientation within a mutually-reinforcing
network of like-minded sites.”143
135

Id.
Id. The term “traditional media” in this sense denotes the media outlets that the study uses as points of
comparison in order to perform its analysis including The New York Times and The Washington Post. See id.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id.; see Richard Hofstadler, The Paranoid Style in American Politics, HARPER’S MAG. (Nov. 1964),
https://harpers.org/archive/1964/11/the-paranoid-style-in-american-politics/. “I call it the paranoid style simply
because no other word adequately evokes the sense of heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and conspiratorial
fantasy that I have in mind…. It is the use of paranoid modes of expression by more or less normal people that
makes the phenomenon significant.” Id.
143
Benkler et al., supra note 133. “By repetition, variation, and circulation through many associated sites,
the network of sites make their claims familiar to readers, and this fluency with the core narrative gives credence
to the incredible.” Id.
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The vast network of sites available to conservatives who are more likely to
share fake news make these fake claims identifiable and familiar thus giving
them credence through “repetition, variation, and circulation.”144
III. GERSH V. ANGLIN
In November of 2018, a district court in Montana heard a lawsuit filed by a
Jewish real estate agent against the publisher of the neo-Nazi site the Daily
Stormer accusing the publisher of “coordinating a ‘terror campaign’ of online
harassment.”145 The case concerned whether a Daily Stormer post which
targeted Gersh was protected speech.146 The post claimed that Gersh was “acting
in furtherance of a perceived Jewish agenda and using Holocaust imagery and
rhetoric.”147 The court found that the publisher, Andrew Anglin, “incited his
followers to harass her as part of a personal campaign.”148
Drawing on Virginia v. Black, the court acknowledged that freedom of
speech protections are not without limits and speech can be regulated in certain
instances.149 Through this lens, the court clarified that although freedom of
speech protections are:
particularly strong when the speech at issue involves “matters of public concern. “‘[N]ot all speech is of equal First Amendment importance,’ however, and where matters of purely private significance
are at issue, First Amendment protections are often less rigorous.” This is so because the regulation of “speech on matters of purely
private concern” does not “threat[en] the free and robust debate of public issues” or “potential[ly] interfere[ ] with a meaningful dialogue of
ideas.”150

Whether speech is of public concern depends upon the “‘content, form, and
context’ of the speech, i.e., ‘what was said, where it was said, and how it was
said.’”151 This encompasses an inquiry into the speech’s relation to matters of

144
Benkler et al., supra note 133; see also Casey Newton, People Older than 65 Share the Most Fake
News, a New Study Finds, VERGE (Jan. 9, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/1/9/18174631/oldpeople-fake-news-facebook-share-nyu-princeton.
145
Karen Zraick, Neo-Nazis Have No First Amendment Right to Harassment, Judge Rules, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/15/us/daily-stormer-anti-semitic-lawsuit.html.
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Gersh v. Anglin, 353 F. Supp. 3d 958, 962–63 (D. Mont. 2018).
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Id.
148
Zraick, supra note 145.
149
Gersh, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 964 (quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003)).
150
Id. (internal citations omitted).
151
Id. (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 454 (2011)) (citing Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985)).
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“political, social, or other concern to the community.”152 The inquiry is satisfied
when the speech is of “general interest and of value and concern to the public.”153
The court then asserted that the publisher was attempting to use ostensibly
public speech “to mask” an attack and insulate speech from liability.154 The court
found that Anglin’s attempt to insulate his speech were ineffective because it
“did nothing to inform the public about any aspect” of public concern.155 He not
only published information about the real estate dispute, but also the personal
contact information of Gersh and people associated with her in “‘an attempt to
turn’ Anglin [and his followers’] personal hostilities into ‘a cause celèbre.’”156
The court then stated that although initially the speech seemed to be public
based on the context—an easily accessible “alt-right ‘news’ blog,” that works
with political issues, “albeit from an extremist viewpoint” can be seen as
“strictly private” because the speech involved “unrelated personal attacks”
which “drew heavily on his readers’ hatred and fear of ethnic Jews.”157 The
online posts created “more than a colorable claim” the posts’ purpose was
harassment rather than to inform.158 The court asserted that “the public context
of the Daily Stormer posts cannot ‘transform the nature of [Anglin’s]
speech.’”159
Finally, the court stated that although it could not prohibit such posts because
of their “morally and factually indefensible worldview,” a state does, in fact,
have the power to “protect its residents from ‘repeated unwanted telephone calls
that are harassing due to their sheer number and frequency.’”160 The Court
clarified that the repugnant, anti-Semitic views espoused in the posts and
directed at Gersh did not go unnoticed.161
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Id. (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983)).
Id. at 964–65 (quoting City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (1983)).
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Id. at 965 (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 455 (2011)).
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Id. (quoting City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84 (2004)).
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Id. at 965–66 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 (1983)), Anglin’s posts provided the “phone
numbers, email addresses, and social media profiles of [Gersh], her husband, twelve-year-old-son, friends, and
colleagues;” [and asked his readers to] ‘Tell them you are sickened by their Jew agenda to attack and harm the
mother of someone whom they disagree with.’” Id. at 962. The posts resulted in Gersh receiving over “700
disparaging and/or threatening messages[.]” Id. at 963.
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Id. at 966 (citing Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 454 (2011)).
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Id. (citing Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 454 (2011)).
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F.3d 939, 954 (9th Cir. 2014)).
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IV. WHITE SUPREMACIST AND NAZI HATE SPEECH ON SOCIAL MEDIA IS NOT
A PROTECTED CLASS OF SPEECH AND THUS CAN BE REGULATED UNDER THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE
The interpretations of free speech doctrines in the United States and
Germany differ drastically enough that scholars have assigned them to different
schools of treatment.162 Yet the language, and oftentimes the reasoning,
employed by each countries’ courts are remarkably similar.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and his “marketplace of ideas” philosophy
may be equated to the freedom to form one’s personality and the freedom to
form an opinion enumerated in Articles 2 and 5 of the German Constitution,
respectively.163 Just as, according to Justice Holmes, the “test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market,” in
Germany expression and formation of opinion through “constant intellectual
debate [and] the clash of opinions” is “one of the foremost human rights.”164 In
neither country, though, are these freedoms absolute.165
The U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Chaplinsky excepted “fighting words”
from First Amendment protection because they are not an “essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality.”166 This language and reasoning parallel the
German Constitutional Court in Lüth which held the “presumption in favour of
free speech” ends when statements “cease to contribute anything to the
formation of opinion” and “where the formation of public opinion on a matter
important to the general welfare is concerned, private and especially individual
economic interests must, in principle, yield.”167
A. Proposed Statutory Requirements
The language and reasoning behind both the United States’ and Germany’s
regulation of freedom of speech, regarding white supremacist speech on social
media, are nearly identical but have been interpreted in varying ways. The limits
placed upon the American government’s ability to proscribe speech are a valid
162

Brugger, supra note 69.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J. dissenting); GRUNDGESETZ [GG]
[BASIC LAW], art. 2(1) & 5(1), translation at https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf.
164
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J. dissenting); Brugger, supra note 69.
165
Henry, supra note 72; see generally R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
166
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
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Henry, supra note 72.
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and representative evolution of the legitimate school of thought that prioritizes
“freedom of speech over most countervailing interests, even when the speech is
filled with hatred.”168 However, this evolution occurred before the advent of
social media and the potential for one person’s speech to be legitimized and
displayed to 2.23 billion people across the globe.169
As a result of the “new” marketplace of ideas created by the Internet and
social media, Congress should enact a statute which bans from social media
platforms racial supremacist speech requiring that: (1) any racial supremacy
messages published advance a demonstrably dangerous true threat to a protected
class of people; (2) the ban be limited to social media as a time, place, and
manner regulation aimed at protecting against the “secondary effects” of white
supremacy on social media rather than suppressing the content of white
supremacist speech; and (3) the publishing of racial supremacy be done
knowingly in an effort to educate, counsel, advocate, promote, or support racial
supremacy.170
The statute would be directed not only at white supremacist speech that aims
to intimidate on the basis of “race, gender, or religion, … or homosexuality,” as
was the case in R.A.V.171 It would be directed at all speech perpetrated by racial
supremacy groups on social media in light of racial—but particularly white
supremacy’s—“long and pernicious history as a signal of impending violence”
and as a “particularly virulent form of intimidation” traditionally perpetrated by
cross burnings but now perpetrated by post sharing.172 A statute does not become
“viewpoint based” because it was motivated by partisan conduct and the such a
statute will not be invalidated solely on an “alleged illicit legislative motive.”173
1. Requirement of a Demonstrable True Threat
Governmental response, when regulating speech, can be formulated to
address the special and overriding interests of the speech.174 In Virginia v. Black,
168

Brugger, supra note 69, at 2.
See discussion, supra Section II.C.
170
City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46–47 (1986).
171
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 362 (2003).
172
Id. at 363.
173
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 724–25 (2000) (“The antipicketing ordinance upheld in Frisby v. Shultz,
487 U.S. 474, a decision in which both of today’s dissenters joined, was obviously enacted in response to the
activities of antiabortion protestors who wanted to protest at the home of a particular doctor to persuade him and
others that they viewed his practice of performing abortions to be murder. We nonetheless summarily concluded
that the statute was content neutral.”); City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 48 (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 383–84 (1968)).
174
City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 49 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509–11
169
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the Court stated that “a prohibition on true threats ‘protects individuals from the
fear of violence’ and ‘from the disruption that fear engenders,’ in addition to
protecting people ‘from the possibility that the threatened violence will
occur.’”175 The Court reasoned that Virginia is allowed to outlaw cross burning
performed “with the intent to intimidate because burning a cross is a particularly
virulent form of intimidation” that may be regulated “in light of cross burning’s
long and pernicious history as a signal of impending violence.”176 Likewise,
Germany outlawed denial of the Holocaust as a means of taking a “major step
towards leaving its National Socialist past behind.”177
Just as slavery is the history with which Americans must bear, the mark of
the Nazi regime is indelible in Germany. The Ku Klux Klan is a reminder of
America’s “violent past centered on segregation” just as “Nazism has changed
the way Germans look at anti-Semitism, which has now become a symbol for
all that went wrong between 1933 and 1945.”178 As a result of this “eye toward
the past,” Section 130 of the German Penal Code outlaws “attacks on human
dignity that incite hatred in a manner likely to cause a breach of the peace,”
language which is very similar to that of Virginia v. Black and the allowance for
states to regulate against the “possibility that the threatened violence will
occur.”179 Just as the pamphlets which were found to have endangered Germany
due to their “racial hatred” and threatening nature to “regular constitutional
order,” cross burning was found to be a “potent symbol[] of shared [Ku Klux
Klan] identity and ideology,” which constituted a “true threat” towards the
family in whose front yard the cross was burned.180
The idea that a government has no right to discriminate against speech on
the basis of its content is much too drastic and absolutist for the modern world.
Despite its presumption in favor of free speech, Germany has seen fit to outlaw
some categories of speech, e.g., Holocaust denial, which according to Justice
White, the United States has done before R.A.V.181
Justice Scalia’s assertion in R.A.V. that the First Amendment is predicated
on the idea that the views of the majority must be “expressed in some fashion

(1969)).
175

Virginia, 538 U.S. at 360.
Id. at 363.
177
Brugger, supra note 69, at 35.
178
Kahn, supra note 18, at 184.
179
Id.; Henry, supra note 72; Virginia, 538 U.S. at 360.
180
BGHSt, 12, 32 (Ger.) (1959); Virginia, 538 U.S. at 356.
181
BVerfG, 1BvR23/94, Apr. 13, 1994, https://law.utexas.edu/transnational/foreign-law-translations/german/case.php?id=621; R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (White, J. concurring).
176
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other than silencing speech on the basis of its content” does not take into account
the fact that Facebook can give a false sense of majority acceptance to ideas,
both true and untrue, which garner minuscule support from only fringe
ideologues.182 By doing so, the Court in R.A.V. effectively took away the ability
of the Government to regulate speech that is of such “de minimis value to
society” as to add nothing of value to it.183 In Justice White’s concurrence, he
warned of protecting such patently false or fringe ideas through the removal of
the Government’s ability to proscribe categories of speech which have
historically earned no First Amendment protection, saying “[s]hould the
government want to criminalize certain fighting words, the Court now requires
it to criminalize all fighting words.”184
A contributing factor to this false sense of majority acceptance on social
media is the fact that on social media display mechanisms, news articles are
displayed in identical format regardless of the poster.185 Facebook’s information
display gives an air of aesthetic legitimacy to a post regardless of its content or
publisher.186 This air of legitimacy contributes to the alarming results of a study
by Princeton University political scientist Andrew Guess which found that the
older an American is, the more prone they are to share false news articles on
Facebook, and Republicans and conservatives were more likely to share links to
fake news sites.187
Humans have an innate inability to grasp and fully understand the real-world
significance of numbers the larger the numbers are.188 It is the “natural
tendency” of humans to “misperceive and miscalculate probabilities, to think
anecdotally instead of statistically,” e.g., to “notice a short stretch of cool days
and ignore the long-term global-warming trend.”189 This idea plays into the
legitimization of white supremacist speech on Facebook, now more than ever,
because of the company’s shift to user-generated algorithmic displays of
information and posts.
User-generated algorithms push posts with the most engagement to the top
of a Facebook user’s newsfeed based on the amount of engagement the post
182

R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 392; see Taub & Fischer, supra note 114.
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 400 (White, J. concurring).
184
Id. at 401.
185
Newton, supra note 144.
186
See Taub & Fischer, supra note 114.
187
Newton, supra note 144.
188
See Michel Shermer, Why Our Brains Do Not Intuitively Grasp Probabilities, SCI. AM. (Sept. 1, 2008),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/why-our-brains-do-not-intuitively-grasp-probabilities/.
189
Id.
183
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receives.190 When a Facebook user sees a post promoting white supremacist
ideals which, arguendo, has been liked 12,000 times, the user’s tendency to
“think anecdotally instead of statistically” will cause the user to falsely believe
there is “widespread community support” for the ideals that the post promotes
when only 0.0000054% of Facebook users have actually indicated support.191
People’s behavior is typically adapted to the social norms of a community which
act as “a brake on bad behavior,” but with such large numbers giving a false
sense of validation to false or fringe ideas, social norms are distorted by a
fraudulent shift in the Overton window.192
When white supremacist speech is posted to Facebook, there are potentially
billions of onlookers and “spectators” which make it more probable that the post
will be viewed as intimidation and thus a true threat, as opposed to the burning
of a cross in a field where there are no spectators. Such online speech is more in
line with the remand of the case against the men who burned the cross in the
front yard of the African-American family.193 Additionally, the right-wing
media ecosystem has the ability to shift the overall media narrative to focus on
topics like immigration, creating more opportunities for white supremacists to
either create or share radical speech published by the litany of “clearly partisan
right-wing websites.”194
Studies show that: (1) right-wing and white supremacist attacks not only
outnumbered violent events by Islamic extremists and left-wing groups nearly
two-to-one, but also were much more deadly; (2) there is a causal link between
Facebook use and right-wing motivated attacks against refugees; and (3) not
only are right-wing and conservative social media users more inclined to believe
and propagate right-wing messages and speech, regardless of truth, but also the
right-wing media ecosystem creates “an internally coherent, relatively insulated

190

Gallegos, supra note 111.
Shermer, supra note 188. For the equation I divided the shares by Facebook active users as of the
second quarter of 2018: 12,000/2,230,000,000 = 0.0000054. This is the number of shares I proposed in the
hypothetical divided by Facebook’s daily active user metric in the second quarter of 2018.
192
Taub & Fischer, supra note 114; see Reitman, supra note 1 (the goal of sites like the Daily Stormer is
to “shift the Overton window, a wonky poli-sci concept describing the process of changing public opinion to
accept ideas that might have previously been radioactive…. From the perspective of white nationalists like Auernheimer (who recently floated the idea of murdering Jewish children in the name of free speech), outrageous
anti-Semitism might shift the window far enough to the right that a goal of an immigrant-free, white ethnostate
would look almost palatable.”); Derek Robinson, How an Obscure Conservative Theory Became the Trump
Era’s Go-to Nerd Phrase, POLITICO (Feb. 25, 2018), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/02/25/
overton-window-explained-definition-meaning-217010 (explaining that the Overton window is “the range of
ideas outside which lie political exile or pariahdom.”).
193
See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 367 (2003).
194
Benkler et al., supra note 133.
191
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knowledge community, reinforcing the shared worldview of readers.”195
Through the lens of these studies, such intimidating posts constitute “attacks on
human dignity that incite hatred in a manner likely to cause a breach of the
peace” as well as a “possibility that the threatened violence will occur.”196 The
positive correlation between how conservative or right-wing a user is and their
predisposition to “fall prey to” and share radical, untrue articles on social media
creates an environment on social media platforms conducive to engendering
fear.197 White supremacist speech is not an “essential part of any exposition of
ideas,” this speech also does not “contribute anything to the formation of opinion
that is presupposed in constitutional law[,]” and it actively creates well-founded
fear of violence in those that are the target and subject of white supremacy
speech, such as people of color and immigrants.198
Right-wing extremism is driven by, among other things, concerns over
illegal immigration, a fear of economic collapse, gun control legislation, and
presidential elections, all of which are consistently the topic of fringe, extreme
right-wing media.199 This “network of mutually-reinforcing hyper-partisan
sites,” including the Daily Stormer and Breitbart, which are shared and given the
air of legitimacy through the user-generated content display functions of
Facebook and other social media platforms.200 These sites create the required
environment of “decontextualized truths, repeated falsehoods, and leaps of
logic” needed for white supremacy indoctrination, radicalization, and
perpetration to be effective and thus is not a protected class of speech when
perpetrated through social media platforms due to the true threat it poses to those
195
196

Id.
Henry, supra note 72 at 133; Virginia, 538 U.S. at 345; see JOINT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, supra note

3, at 4.
197
Benkler et al., supra note 133; Lois Beckett, Pittsburgh Shooter Was Fringe Figure in Online World
of White Supremacist Rage, GUARDIAN (Oct. 30, 2018, 4:00 PM EST) https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2018/oct/30/pittsburgh-synagogue-shooter-was-fringe-figure-in-online-world-of-white-supremacist-rage
(explaining that the 2018 murder of 11 people at the Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburg, Pennsylvania was
perpetrated by a man who frequented Gab.com, a social networking site popular with white supremacists. The
man informed the arresting officers that his motive was his belief that “Jews ‘were committing a genocide to his
people;” a conspiracy theory which “mirrors the online trail of white supremacist comments posted by a ‘Robert
Bowers’ on Gab.com.”).
198
Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); BVerfG, 1BvR23/94, Apr. 13, 1994,
https://law.utexas.edu/transnational/foreign-law-translations/german/case.php?id=621; see JOINT INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN , supra note 3, at 4 (Over the past five years, various rightwing extremists, including militias and white
supremacists, have adopted the immigration issue as a call to action, rallying point, and recruiting tool. Debates
over appropriate immigration levels and enforcement policy generally fall within the realm of protected political
speech under the First Amendment, but in some cases, anti-immigration or strident pro-enforcement fervor has
been directed against specific groups and has the potential to turn violent).
199
DAVID NEIWERT, ALT-AMERICA: THE RISE OF THE RADICAL RIGHT IN THE AGE OF TRUMP (2017).
200
Benkler et al., supra note 133;

MIXONCOMMENTPROOFS_2.3.20

2020]

2/10/2020 10:21 AM

NOT YOUR FATHER’S MARKETPLACE

425

who have historically been persecuted in the United States.201
2. Secondary Effects Requirement and Time, Place, and Manner
The ostensible reason for regulating the time, place, and manner of where
white supremacy can be perpetrated on the internet is the effect such perpetration
of speech has on people of color and immigrants. That the effect is a result of
the speech’s content no more renders a statute prohibiting white supremacy on
social media a content-based regulation than the statute at issue in Hill v.
Colorado.202 A content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation is
constitutional so long as it is “designed to serve a substantial governmental
interest” and does not “unreasonably limit alternative avenues of
communication.”203
A “correlation with subject and viewpoint” will always exist “when the law
regulates conduct that has become the signature of one side of a controversy.”204
The intention of a statute removing white supremacist speech from social media
would be to dissipate the offensive behavior associated with the speech, not the
suppression of the content of the speech due to a “disagreement with the message
it conveys.”205
Such a statute would be narrowly tailored in that it would not altogether ban
such speech from the internet, as such a ban would be difficult, if not impossible
to justify on grounds other than the speech’s content, but would merely
circumscribe where such speech may take place.206 A ban from social media
would, based on the secondary effect of the true threat that white supremacy
poses, be “justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.”207
As long as the statute was worded as to proscribe all dangerous racial supremacy,
white supremacist speech would not be “singled out.”208 It would affect only the

201
Id.; see Virginia, 538 U.S. at 363; JOINT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, supra note 3, at 5; Taub & Fischer,
supra note 114.
202
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (“It is important to recognize that the validity of punishing some
expressive conduct, and the permissibility of a time, place, or manner restriction, does not depend on showing
that the particular behavior or mode of delivery has no association with a particular subject or opinion.” (Stouter,
J., concurring)).
203
City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986); see Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312
(1988).
204
Hill, 530 U.S. at 737 (Stouter, J., concurring).
205
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
206
City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 47.
207
Id. at 48 (citing Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 771 (1976)).
208
Id. at 53.
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speech “shown to produce the unwanted secondary effects” and would not be
invalidated because the speech that would most immediately be affected “has
become the signature” of white supremacists or because the targets of the
legislation are the ones who propagate that speech.209 It makes no difference that
the danger racial supremacy currently poses is “almost unique” to white
supremacists.210 If it could be proven that Icelandic or Tongan supremacy posed
a true threat, such speech would also be “a proscribable class of speech [which]
can be swept up incidentally within the reach of a statute directed at conduct
rather than speech.”211
Lastly, such a statute would leave open alternate avenues of communication
sufficient as to not abridge the First Amendment because white supremacists
would be free to use the entire internet to propagate their views, just not social
media. The First Amendment is not violated when a leaves open other avenues
of communication, particularly the entirety of the internet outside of social
media.212 Neither the Renton nor the Hill Courts conditioned the closure of one
avenue of communication upon the explicit existence of a commensurate
avenue.213 White supremacists and right-wing extremists must “fend for
themselves” in the marketplace of ideas without the use of the intellectual
subsidy granted to them by social media and its ability to falsely legitimize
fringe views.214 Just as the First Amendment does not “compel[] the Government
to ensure that adult theaters … will be able to obtain sites at bargain prices,” it
does not require that demonstrably dangerous speech that poses a true threat be
given an unregulated platform with which to perpetrate the evil that some in the
United States has been fighting for so long.215
It is important to note that it is not the listeners’ reactions to speech that is of

209

Id at 48; Hill, 530 U.S. at 738; Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320.
Boos, 485 U.S. at 320.
211
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992); City of Renton, 475 U.S. 51 (arguing that there
was no issue with the city’s choice to “first … address the potential problems created by one particular kind of
adult business.” In their view, this “in no way suggests that the city has ‘singled out’ adult theaters for discriminatory treatment.”).
212
Hill, 530 U.S. at 726.
213
City of Renton, 475 U.S 55 (arguing that the lack of undeveloped land for sale and “commercially
viable adult theater sites within” the area left occupiable by adult theaters, the Court of Appeals found the ordinance to be a “‘substantial restriction’ on speech.”). The Court should be cautious when there is a potential to
“greatly restrict access to lawful speech,” but unless the regulation “remove[s] a subject or viewpoint from effective discourse … a reasonable restriction intended to affect only the time, place, or manner of speaking is
perfectly valid.” Id.
214
Id. at 54; see discussion, supra Section II.C.
215
City of Renton, 475 U.S at 54; see discussion, supra Section V.A.1.
210
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concern when analyzing this requirement.216 This element of the statute is not
concerned with whether the listener finds the speech offensive. It is concerned
with the secondary effect of white supremacist radicalization being taken offline
and causing fear and harm in the real world.217 It is not just that the dignity of
the audience is subject to adverse emotional impact when white supremacist
speech is made, but that the dignity of the audience and those that are not in the
audience, i.e., the victims of white supremacist threats and violence that occur
in the real world by those radicalized online, are subject to adverse emotional
and physical impact when the effects of the speech, particularly indoctrination,
radicalization, violence, are undertaken based on the color of one’s skin color,
ethnic background, or religious faith.218
An unwilling listener has the right to be free from unwanted communication
and thus to be left alone.219 Given that social media can create a false sense of
majority acceptance in fringe, racist ideas, “how far may men go in persuasion
and communication and still not violate the right of those whom they would
influence?”220 Just as an unwilling listener has a right to not be the unwilling
recipient of persuasion, does this right not extend in the modern world to a right
to not be persuaded into believing demonstrably dangerous and false ideas based
upon false pretenses given the air of legitimacy through user-engagement? 221 Is
this not more so the case when the “degree of captivity makes it impractical for
the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure[?]”222 Because Facebook users
do not have a significant ability to consent to what appears on their newsfeeds,
a fortiori, regulation is even more justified in the case of social networks.223
From America’s inception, but particularly during the post-reconstruction
era to the Civil rights era, people could see racist acts being perpetrated in
person, which could create a moment of decision on whether to support such an
act. With the “echo chamber” which Facebook and social networks help to
create, this choice is lessened or absent all together because of the isolation from
“moderating voices [and] authority figures” and professional gatekeepers of the

216

Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 315, 319–21 (1988).
JOINT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, supra note 3; see discussion supra Section II.C.
218
Boos, 485 U.S. at 321–22; Taub & Fischer, supra note 114; JOINT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, supra note
3; see Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003); Taub & Fischer, supra note 114.
219
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 718 (2000) (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
220
Id. at 718 (quoting American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 204
(1921)); see also discussion, supra Section II.C.
221
Hill, 530 U.S. at 718.
222
Id. (quoting Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975)).
223
See discussion, supra Section II.C.
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past.224 The German government has chosen to limit the ability of those who
would seek to return to a past full of persecution and discrimination.225 With the
advent of social media, it is time, now more than ever, for the American
government to do the same.
3. “Knowingly” Engaging in Education, Counseling, Etc.
a. “Knowingly”
A requirement that the sharing be done knowingly would ordinary people
would be able to reasonably understand what conduct is prohibited.226 In Hill v.
Colorado, the requirement that the infringement of the eight-foot buffer zone
around those entering the medical facility be done “knowingly” helped to protect
those “who thought they were keeping pace with the targeted individual” but
had actually violated the law.227
A statutory requirement that one “knowingly” attempts to educate, counsel,
advocate, promote, or support racial supremacy would “distinguish speech
activities likely to have those consequences from speech activities that are most
unlikely to have those consequences.”228 Just as with any regulation, one can
think of different situations where the meaning of these terms could come into
question, but the potential for misapplication and speculation about situations
where the terms may come into question will not allow for a facial attack of a
statute when it is being used as intended in the vast majority of cases.229

b. Requirement of Intent to Engage in Education, Counseling, etc.
If white supremacists who repeatedly espouse such views on social media
only intended to reflect on the superiority of the white race, there are a multitude
of methods in which this can be done in private including journals, blogs, or
hosting their own website. By deliberately publishing on social media sites like
Facebook, they are attempting to educate, counsel, advocate, promote, or
support white supremacy. This is especially true for organization pages like that
of the AfD, the subject of the German empirical study on Facebook
224

Taub & Fischer, supra note 114.
See discussion, supra II.A.2.
226
Hill, 530 U.S. at 732.
227
Id. at 727 (quoting Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y. 519 U.S. 357, 378 n.9 (1997)).
228
Id. at 725.
229
Id. at 733. The potential for misapplication is hedged against by the requirement that the speech be a
demonstrably dangerous true threat. See id. This requirement protects against instances where the publisher acts
in a gray area that is ultimately non-threatening and thus not deserving of sanction. Id.
225
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engagement.230 The entire survival of social media platforms depend upon user
engagement and content sharing to drive pageviews and engagement with
advertisers.231 Facebook and other social media platforms are by definition
mediums through which information is intended to be shared and disseminated;
therefore, by publishing speech on social media, the publishers are intending for
the post to be liked, shared, and commented on and for users to view and engage
with the information.232
By including the requirement that the publisher of a social media post be
educating, counseling, etc, “the most aggressive and vociferous” posters, such
as the “superposters,” might be forced to “moderate their confrontational and
harassing conduct, and thereby make it easier for thoughtful and law-abiding”
debate and information sharing to take place.233 The First Amendment protects
“the right of every citizen to ‘reach the minds of willing listeners;’” and by
including the education, counseling, etc. requirement in the statute, more willing
listeners will be reached with ideas that merit victory in the market place of
ideas.234
Just as one would not be allowed to burn a cross in the front yard of an
African-American family, one should not be allowed to repeatedly post
messages of white supremacy and hate based on racial, religious, or other similar
animus.235 Such posts are a form of virtual cross burning that is more visible to
those it threatens and creates a well-founded fear of violence similar to that
created by the physical burning of a cross. By deliberately posting on Facebook,
white supremacists are intending to spread the message of hate that is a part of
the history of the United States and thus a true threat to Americans.236
B. Commerce Clause Based Regulation
As the law stands now, Congress cannot regulate social media activity based
on aggregate substantial economic effect unless the activity constitutes—or is

230

Muller & Schwarz, supra note 3; see Taub & Fischer, supra note 114.
See Ben Gilbert, How Facebook Makes Money from Your Data, in Mark Zuckerberg’s Words, BUS.
INSIDER (Apr. 11, 2018, 10:25 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/how-facebook-makes-money-accordingto-mark-zuckerberg-2018-4.
232
Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/101044130
15393571 (arguing that the purpose of Facebook is to help people stay connected and bring us closer together
with the people that matter to us.).
233
Hill, 530 U.S. at 727; Taub & Fischer, supra note 114.
234
Hill, 530 U.S. at 728.
235
See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
236
Id.
231
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closely connected to—any sort of “economic” or “commercial” activity.237
Facebook has both a social and a business function, but the two are intertwined.
At the time Heart of Atlanta was decided, people of color traveling had to
deliberately choose where and when to stop and stay in the country.238 This
demonstrates that there were more concentrated pockets of racism around the
country which disrupted economic activity and commerce.239 Unlike the choice
minorities had during the Civil Rights Era to travel facing extreme risk or stay
put, Facebook’s user-generated algorithm does not give users the choice or
control over what shows up in their newsfeeds beyond the people with whom
they choose to be friends.240 Individuals cannot control what their friends like,
share, or publish and as a result what the user-generated algorithm will display
on their newsfeeds. The algorithm is “optimized” to “show more content from
friends and family” and less from businesses unless the businesses’ posts have
large amounts of engagement. 241 Therefore, Facebook will produce and curate
few posts according to the “professional gatekeepers such as editors,” who have
historically helped to filter out hate speech and more posts by family and friends
which have no such filter.242
The increase in non-curated posts coupled with the predisposition that rightwing extremists and conservatives have to believe and propagate falsities and
the connection between “users’ internet or Facebook access” and anti-refugee
violence only helps to further social media’s “closed environment with its own
moral rules.”243 This has led to a dramatic increase in attacks against refugees in
Germany and hate crimes like the Charleston shooting and the murder of Heather
Heyer in Charlottesville.244 While a growing number of white supremacists are
radical online, studies show that they are carrying out acts of “lethal violence”
237
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
238
Heart of Atlanta Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
239
Id.
240
See discussion, supra Section II.C.
241
Gallegos, supra note 111.
242
Taub & Fischer, supra note 114.
243
Benkler et al., supra note 133; Muller & Schwarz, supra note 3.
244
Id.; Rachel Kaazdi Ghansah, A Most American Terrorist: The Making of Dylann Roof, GQ (Aug. 21,
2017), https://www.gq.com/story/dylann-roof-making-of-an-american-terrorist (“To find sympathetic allies,
Rogers, the owner of a flag company called Patriotic Flags, stays in the comments section of the social-media
accounts of pissed off white men, and when the time is right, he posts links to his company, with its bazaar of
Confederate, white-nationalist, Nazi, and apartheid-era flags, similar to the patches that Dylann Roof sewed onto
his jacket. Rogers has said he was ‘devastated’ to learn that Roof connected to his writings, and he denies ever
meeting Roof, going so far as to call it libelous to associate the two of them.” (emphasis added)); see Jonathan
M. Katz & Farah Stockman, James Fields Guilty of First-Degree Murder in Death of Heather Heyer, WASH.
POST (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/07/us/james-fields-trial-charlottesville-verdict.html.
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in the real world with racial minorities as their “primary targets.”245
Advertisements, which are the primary revenue source for social media
companies like Facebook, are intertwined with posts from family and friends
which the user-generated algorithm aims at promoting. 246 Posts with the most
engagement are prioritized at the top of the Newsfeed.247 Advertisers, which are
in the business of promoting businesses and enticing consumers to engage in
commerce, tell Facebook what type of person they would like to target with their
ads, and based on the personal data that Facebook harvests from its users those
ads are displayed in the targeted users’ newsfeeds.248 Facebook also has a
Facebook Marketplace where users can buy and sell goods.249 Both targeted
advertising and Facebook Marketplace qualify as “economic” or “commercial”
activity or closely connected language required by United States v. Morrison.250
The Court’s view of cross burning in Virginia v. Black as a “potent symbol”
of Ku Klux Klan “identity and ideology,” is applicable, now more than ever, to
white supremacist speech on social media platforms.251 Since symbolism and a
sense of general agreement can be falsified through user-generated content
distribution and ordering, white supremacist speech constitutes a true threat
towards the subjects of the speech. There is a well-founded fear that white
supremacy and right-wing extremism are increasing and growing more deadly
and dangerous in the United States.252 As such, the Commerce Clause gives
Congress the ability to regulate white supremacist speech on social media
platforms.
Social media has created a world in which indoctrinators no longer have to
seek out those sympathetic to their cause. False and misleading information
about white supremacy is displayed front and center without permission or
desire to initially see it, gradually radicalizing those most vulnerable to
radicalization. White supremacy is undeniably a true threat to the American
population.253 It creates a “fear of violence” which disrupts not only commerce
245
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Transcript of Mark Zuckerberg’s Senate Hearing, WASH. POST (April 10, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/04/10/transcript-of-mark-zuckerbergs-senate-hearing/?utm_term=.
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https://www.consumerreports.org/computers-internet/facebook-marketplace-what-you-should-know/.
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in America but also the lives of each and every American.254 Germany has seen
fit to ban such speech due to the effects it has on historically oppressed
classes.255 Now it is time for the United States to do the same.
CONCLUSION
White supremacy and far-right terrorist attacks are nothing new to the United
States of America. Far-right activists and the Ku Klux Klan attacked and
bombed churches and Civil Rights-related meetings so often that Birmingham—
Alabama’s “most important civil and industrial center”—earned the nickname
“Bombingham.”256 Likewise, Germany has also confronted far-right regimes in
its past. Both countries conquered the fascist stronghold put on the continent and
the world during the early twentieth century only to have it rear its ugly head
again.257 Just as Germans have a duty to protect against the resurgence of their
past evils, so do Americans. White supremacy is the ugly, indelible stain on
America’s past which we must work to erase.
Just as German courts have found that “where the formation of public
opinion on a matter important to the general welfare is concerned, private and
especially individual … interests must, in principle, yield,” the district court in
Gersh v. Anglin similarly found that “the regulation of ‘speech on matters of
purely private concern’ does not ‘threaten the free and robust debate of public
issues.’”258 The United States cannot allow white supremacists to propagate
unfounded, dangerous speech on social media platforms under the guise of
speaking on subjects of public interest and concern.259 In the district court’s
view, the fact that white supremacist speech is perpetrated through a social
media platform instead of more traditional modes of intimidation and
recruitment does not create a shield barring the speech from regulation.260
It is important to note that this paper is aimed only at white supremacist
speech online. Its advocacy and conclusions are not meant to be a vehicle to
limit speech in other forms online. As the Gersh court proclaimed, “the [c]ourt
must be cautious to avoid policing the speech’s content, as the ‘inappropriate or
254

Id.; Virginia, 538 U.S. at 360.
See discussion, supra Section II.A.2.
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Henry, supra note 72; Gersh v. Anglin, 353 F. Supp. 3d 958 (D. Mont. 2018) (citing Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985)).
259
Gersh, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 965 (citing City of San Diego, Cal. v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77 (1983)).
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controversial character of a statement is irrelevant to the question whether it
deals with a matter of public concern.”261 Freedom of speech is of paramount
importance in a democracy, but so too is the protection of people from violence
and the fear of violence engendered by white supremacist and Nazi speech.
Stopping this violence and fear will go far to achieve these goals. One must ask,
at what point does the protection of a speech’s content that adds nothing of value
to public discourse and truly threatens entire classes of human beings living in
the United States give way to the protection of these classes from such threats
and violence? The tipping point has been reached, and like Germany, it is time
the United States put dignity and equality ahead of “verbally aggressive speech”
that spawns violence against those whose dignity and equality Congress has a
duty to protect.262
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